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Marriage to a Paramour After

Divorce: The Conflict of Laws
Professor Taintor here examnnes the extent of the extraterritorial effect of statutes which prohibit mamage by a divorced person to his paramour if the basis for dissolution of the prior marriagewas adultery. He concludes that
the interests of uniformity and sound policj require that
the statutes have effect only in the states which proscribe
such marriages, and that an otherwise valid marriage
should not be nullified unless the divorcing state was
the intended domicile at the time of the second marriage.

Charles W. Taintor 11*
STATUTES in some of the States' forbid the remarriage
of a divorced libellee for various periods after the decree is granted.
I shall consider in detail herein only the type which is found in
Louisiana, Pennsylvania and Tennessee: statutes forbidding the
marriage of the libellee and the paramour after a divorce for adultery and during the lifetime of the former spouse.These are old,' or are re-enactments 4 of old statutes and, m spite
of differences in their terms, have been construed in substantially
the same way in all three States. Marriages forbidden by them
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law
1. The word -State, capitalized, will throughout be used to mean state of
the union; without the capitalization, the word 'state" will mean state in the conflict of laws sense-a geographical subdivision of the surface of the earth having
its own laws.
2. In each of these States the prohibition applies only to marriage to the person for adultery with whom the divorce was granted.
3. The Pennsylvania statute was enacted as Act of March 13, 1815, 6 Sm. L. 286,
§ 9, and is now PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 169 (Purdon 1930). It nght be argued
that the Pennsylvama marriage law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, §§ 1-5 (Purdon 1930),
nnpliedly repealed the absolute prohibition of the earlier statute, since the only reference in the present statute is to forbidding the issuance of a marriage license
under the circumstances the 1815 law proscribed. This seems improbable, however.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was of the opinion that repeal was
not intended. Warrenberger v. Folsom, 239 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1956) (Pa.) [subsequent snilar references to states are meant to indicate the State whose laws
were applied].
4. The Louisiana statute stems from CODE NAor.oN art. 298, was first enacted
in that state in 1827, and is now LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 161 (West 1952). The
Tennessee statute was first enacted in 1835-1836, and is now TmEN.CODE A.'N.
§ 36-831 (1955).
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are void in the sense that they are subject to collateral attack,
though, in Louisiana and Pennsylvania and probably in Tennessee,
either party may have a decree of annulment.' Neither party can
derive any fights from such marriages" and, without the aid of
other statutory provisions, children born to such unions are illegitimate.7
The complete invalidity of such forbidden marriages arises from
the terms of the Louisiana statute8 and, in that State and the
others is explained in terms of morality and public policy."
To what marriages do these statutes apply? Obviously they make
void any intrastate marriages between persons domiciled in the
state who intend to remain there.
In all three of the States, they apply to extrastate ceremonies in
5. Rhodes v. Miller, 189 La. 288, 179 So. 430 (1938); Maurer v. Maurer, 163
Pa. Super. 264, 60 A.2d 440 (1948); Kalmbacher v. Kalmbacher, 63 Pa. D. & C.
195 (Pa. C.P. 1945).
I have found no Tennessee case directly in point, but since a decree of annulment in a case of this kind amounts only to a declaration of nullity and its only
effect is to get the fact on record, I see no reason why such a decree should not be
available in Tennessee. Any argument directed to estoppel or unclean bands is well
answered in the Rhodes and Maurer cases supra.
6. Warrenberger v. Folsom, 239 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1956) (Pa.) (second "wife"
not a widow for the purpose of Social Security benefits); In re Mayall's Naturalization, 154 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1957) (no marriage which would establish
"good moral character" for the purpose of naturalization); In re Stull's Estate,
183 Pa. 625, 39 Ad. 16 (1898) (letters of administration denied to the second
"wife"); Pennegar v. State, 87 Tenn. 244, 10 S.W. 305 (1889) (conviction of
lewdness); Owen v. Bracket, 7 Lea 448 (Tenn. 1881) (homestead right denied).
7. Succession of Gabisso, 119 La. 704, 44 So. 438 (1907); Jennings v. Jennings,
165 Tenn. 295, 54 S.W.2d 961 (1932).
An amendment to TzN. CODE: ANN. § 36-832 (1955), adding the italicized
words, "the annulment or dissolution of the marriage shall not in any wise affect
the legitimacy of the children of the same," appears to have protected the children
born to such prohibited unions. See Taliaferro v. Rogers, 35 Tenn. App. 521, 248
S.W.2d 835 (1951) (semble).
The situation in Pennsylvania is not clear. After forbidding the marriages, the
statute continues: "but nothing herein contained shall be construed to extend to
or affect or render illegitimate any children born of the body of the wife during
coverture." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 169 (Purdon 1930). Since the marriages
are void, there is technically no coverture; yet it is probable that this was intended
to make legitimate the children born to these void marriages. Otherwise, it Is
difficult to see to what facts the provision would apply.
8. "In case of divorce, on account of adultery, the guilty party can never contract matrimony with his or her accomplice in adultery, under the penalty of
being considered and prosecuted as guilty of the crime of bigamy, and under the
penalty of nullity of the new marriage." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 161 (West 1952).
9. Such marriages are forbidden for reasons "of public policy" and are in
"derogation of good morals." Succession of Gabisso, 119 La. 704, 713-14, 44 So.
438, 441 (1907).
Such a marriage is "contrary to the public policy of the government of the
domicil, in that it offends against the prevailing sense of good morals among the
people there dwelling." In re Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 632, 39 Atl. 16, 18 (1898).
The statute "accords with public policy ...and tends to assure a decent propaT] he
gation of the human race." Owen v. Bracket, 7 Lea 448, 449 (Tenn. 1881).
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states which have enacted no such statutes, if the prohibiting state
was the domicile and the intended family domicile. 10 In Louisiana
the statute was applied where the man was domiciled in Louisiana
which was the intended family domicile, while the woman was
domiciled in Mississippi, where the ceremony was performed 11

The stated reasons vary. In Succession of Gabisso'2 there was a

short statement that a citizen and resident of a state cannot contract a valid marriage in another state when such a marriage is forbidden by the law of his home state "from considerations of morality and public policy." The most complete statement of the reasons
is to be found in Pennegarv. State' in language which was directly
quoted in Stulrs Estate:'4 "
Now, believing as we do, that the statute in question... is expressive
of a decided State policy not to permit the sensibilities of the innocent
and injured husband and wife . . . to be wounded, nor the public decency to be affronted by being forced to witness the continued cohabitation of the adulterous pair, even under the guise of a subsequent marriage, performed in another State for the purpose of evading our statute,
and believing that the moral sense of the community is shocked and outraged by such an exhibition, we will not allow such parties to shield
themselves behind a general rule of the law of marriage, the wisdom and
perpetuity of which depends as much upon the judicious exceptions thereto as upon the inherent right of the rule itself.

The rule referred to is, of course, the standard statement that it
is the common law that a marriage which is valid under lex loci
celebrationisis everywhere valid.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Stull, added:
The foregoing reasoning is satisfactory to us. It invokes practically
three distinct ideas, to wit: (1) that the foreign marriage is contrary to
the positive statute of the domicil; (2) that it is contrary to the public
policy of the government of the domicil, in that it offends against the prevailing sense of good morals among the people there dwelling; and (3)
it was contracted for the express purpose of evading the positive law of
the domiciL ... The combination of these three objections seems to be
most fatal to the validity of the marriage thus contracted. The writer is
disposed to regard each one of them as fatal.15
public decency [is] affronted by being forced to witness the continued cohabitation
of the adulterous pair, even under the guise of a subsequent marriage. . .
Pennegar v. State, 87 Tenn. 244, 255, 10 S.W. 305, 308 (1889).
10. Maurer v. Maurer, 163 Pa. Super. 264, 60 A.2d 440 (1948); Immendorfs
Estate, 21 Pa. County Ct. 268 (Orphans' Ct. 1898); In re Stulls Estate, supra
note 9; Pennegar v. State, supra note 9; Bennett v. Anderson, 20 Tenn. App. 523,
101 S.W.2d 148 (1937).
11. Succession of Gabisso, 119 La. 704, 44 So. 438 (1907); Succession of
Hernandez, 46 La. Ann. 962, 15 So. 461 (1894) (srmble).
12. 119 La. 704, 713, 44 So. 438, 441 (1907).
13. 87 Tenn. 244, 255, 10 SAV. 305, 308 (1889).
14. 183 Pa. 625, 632, 39 A. 16, 18 (1898).
15. Id. at 632-33, 39 At. at 18.
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It seems clear that this sort of language is intended to take this
particular prohibition out of the almost uniform rule that prohibitions of the remarriage of the guilty party in a divorce suit are
penalties and have no extraterritorial effect.'0 It is necessary, therefore, to examine the reasons given by the courts in order to determine which, if any, justify the rule of invalidity.
It is simply not true, and it was not true at the times when the
three leading cases were decided, that a marriage which is contrary to the positive statute of the domicile is void if the ceremony
takes place in another state." Now, and at the time when these
three cases were decided, intention to evade the law of the domicile
does not make marriages void.18 This leaves only the reasons
founded on public policy.'" One of them was said in Stull and
Pennegar to be the protection of the innocent spouse from witnessing the continued cohabitation of the guilty pair. This does not
seem to hold water. In all three States, the prohibition applies
only to cases in which the divorce was for adultery with the second
"spouse." Is the innocent spouse any less hurt by witnessing the
cohabitation after divorce if he or she knew of the adultery, but
could not prove it or preferred a less disgraceful cause for the
divorce, e.g., indignities to the person?
The second policy reason was said in these two cases to be the
protection of the moral sense of the community from being shocked
and outraged by such an exhibition- the continued cohabitation
of the guilty pair. It may be that this held water at the dates of
these cases and somewhat later. Those of us who remember our
parents' attitude toward divorce, and particularly their opinion of
a divorced woman, will remember that divorce, itself, was a disgrace and that the divorced woman was looked at askance, even
if she was the innocent party. It may be that, then, divorce for
adultery was more disgraceful than other divorces 0 and that these
prohibitory statutes reflected a strong community sentiment.
16. See Taintor, Marriage and Conflict of Laws, 9 VAND. L. REv. 607, 625
(1956); Taintor, Effect of Extra-State Marriage Ceremonies, 10 Miss. L.J. 105,
111, (1938).
17. The earliest case found is Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157 (1819), a
case of miscegenation. See cases cited Taintor, supra note 16.
18. Intention to evade has been mentioned in a number of cases almost all of
which fall into one of two categories: type of marriage not abhorrent to the people of the state- extrastate ceremonies effective; type of marriage abhorrent to
those people- extrastate ceremonies ineffective and marriage void. Taintor, supra
note 16, 10 Miss. L.J. at 128-31; 9 VAND. L. REV,. at 629 and cases cited in
both articles. The earliest case in which I found an express mention of intention
to evade is Putnum v. Putnam, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 433 (1829), which dealt with
a statutory prohibition of remarriage of the libellee for a period after divorce;
the extrastate ceremony was effective.
19. See quotation accompanying text at note 14 supra.
20. This idea is reflected in Williams v. Oates, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 535 (1845),
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If this was ever a good reason it is of doubtful validity today.
In the first place, no like statute has been enacted in any other
State and it is improbable that the people of these three have a
more easily shocked moral sense than do those of the others. It is
at least permissible to wonder whether the continued existence of
these statutes does not reflect legislative inertia rather than a continued strong public sentiment.2' In the second place, those whose
sentiments might be offended by such remarriages are not likely
to know the grounds on which their neighbors were divorced, except perhaps in the smaller communities where people tend to
know more about the affairs of their neighbors. Moreover, in these
communities people are likely to know of the adultery and to be
just as much offended by the cohabitation of the guilty pair, even
though the divorce was granted on some other ground than adultery.
A reason which seems better was given in Newman v. Kimbrough,22 decided in Tennessee eleven years after Pennegar:
The policy of the law of this state is to maintain the marriage rela-

tion, and to remove all inducements of infidelity on the part of the husband or the wife possibly by shutting off all hope of marriage with a
paramour during the life of the wife who has obtained the divorce.

Protection of existing marriages seems somehow more noble,
even if that protection is given by a threat of the invalidity of a
subsequent marriage, than does invalidating such a marriage by
what seems to be a penalty imposed on the libellee. The notion
back of the protection seems to be that the threat will tend to diminish the commission of adultery with a person whom the potential adulterer would want to marry. Here, again, our brethren in
the field of sociology could help the bench, the bar, and the legislature, by discovering the answer to the following questions. In
those states in which remarriage to the paramour is not forbidden,
what proportion of libellees do marry the person for adultery with
whom the divorce was decreed? In the three States where such remarriages are forbidden, is there a smaller proportion of divorces
for adultery? In those states, what proportion of persons who could
get a divorce for adultery actually choose a different ground? What
and Marshall v. Marshall, 2 Hun. 288 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874), in both of which an
extrastate ceremony was held ineffective where prohibition was of the remarriage
of the libellee in a divorce for adultery. Marshall was overruled by Van Voorhis
v. Brintnall, 86 N.Y. 18 (1881).
21. This is one of those situations in which our brethren, the sociologists, could
help the legislatures, the courts, and the bars, by getting the answers to these
questions. How strong is the popular feeling about divorce? About remarriage
after divorce for adultery? About remarriage to a paramour after divorce for
adultery with another? With him or her?
22. 59 S.W. 1061, 1064 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900).
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proportion of those who do choose a different ground hold the
threat of divorce for adultery over the errant spouse for the purpose of getting a more advantageous separation agreement?
Discussion of the other situations in which these statutes might
be applied requires memory of the techniques used by the courts
when applying them to marriages of domiciliaries who leave the
state for a marriage ceremony intending to make that state the
family domicile. In all three States one of the techniques is application of the principle that persons cannot effectively marry in other
states intending to return to their domicile, if the marriage is of a
type which is there abhorred. In Pennsylvania the courts add: "A
personal incapacity to marry is imposed."23
It is clear that these statutes do not apply to marriages of a person and the paramour who change domicile to another state and
marry in any state whose laws do not include such a statute, even
though the divorce was decreed in one of the three States and even
though they later return to the divorcing State. 4 The theory is
that, when they married, they acquired rights under the laws of
their new domicile and that those rights persist, i.e., the marriage
is wholly valid. This is the correct rule aside from any notion
about the acquisition of rights. The question should be decided
upon the facts at the time of the marriage. At that time neither the
innocent spouse nor the people of the divorcing state were threatened with witnessing the cohabitation and the imposed personal
incapacity would not survive a change of domicile.
It is not clear whether these statutes apply to marriages in the
following circumstances: the divorce is decreed in one of the three
States; the libellee and the paramour change domicile to another
state; they marry there, intending to make their family domicile in
the divorcing State.25 The only case which I know to be directly in
point was one in which the divorce was decreed in Tennessee, and
the marriage was in Texas. 26 If there is any situation in which a
23. See In re Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 629, 39 At. 16, 18 (1898); Kalmbacher v. Kalmbacher, 63 Pa. D. & C. 204 (C.P. 1945).
24. "[We] do not mean to be understood as holding that, if the parties had continued to remain and live in Texas, the laws of this state could so far affect the
relation of these parties as to declare the marriage there invalid ...... Newman
v. Kimbrough, 59 S.W. 1061, 1064 (Tenn. Ch.App. 1900) (dictum).
"She never acquired any rights as an inhabitant of the state of Maryland ......
In re Stull's Estate, 183 P. 625, 629, 39 Atl. 16 (1898). Similar language was used
in Maurer v. Maurer, 163 Pa. Super. 264, 267, 60 A.2d 440, 441 (1948).
25. To the effect that the law of marriage of the intended family domicile
should be applied to determine the substantive validity of a marriage and that
there has been judicial recognition of this principle, see Taintor, What Law Governs the Ceremony, Incidents and Status of Marriage, 19 B.U.L. REv. 353, 366-74
(1939); Taintor, supra note 16, 9 VAND. L. REv. at 610-14.
26. Newman v. Kimbrough, 59 S.W. 1061 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900).

1959]

MARRIAGE AFTER DIVORCE

court of the intended family domicile would feel impelled to apply
its own statute this is it. Here in fact were all of the evils against
which the public policy reasons were intended to protect. Yet, it
is not clear whether the marriage was held void or whether the
court merely denied to the parties the benefit of a claim arising
from the marriage, namely, that it freed the "wife" from guardianship of her property. If this is what the court intended, it is difficult to justify this sort of "indirect penology." 2 ' If such a marriage
is held void in any of the three States, there seems to be no valid
criticism of the result.
If, however, one of these States is not the former domicile in
which the divorce was decreed but is only the intended family
domicle, there is no valid basis for applying the statute. Obviously
the state can impose no personal incapacity on nondomiciliaries
who marry elsewhere; it will be only by chance that the innocent
spouse will witness the cohabitation; and it is, to say the least,
highly improbable that the people of the community, even if it is
a small one, will know the ground of the foreign divorce.
It is not clear whether these statutes apply to marriages of persons who are divorced in a state which has no prohibition of remarriage, change domicile to one of the three States and marry
there. These were the facts in In re Mayalrs Naturalization,2 but
the court made nothing of it, holding the marriage void for the
reasons stated below. It seems, however, that the reasons against
application of the statute are the same as those given in the immediately preceding paragraph.
Are these statutes applicable to marriages of persons who are
divorced in other states with no such prohibition and who marry
in one of the three States, intending to make the family domicile
in some state which has not enacted the prohibition? The beliefs
of trial courts of New York and Pennsylvania have been opposite,
the former believing the Pennsylvania statute to be inapplicable,
the latter believing it applicable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a nondiversity case, believed that,
if the question came before a court of statewide jurisdiction in
Pennsylvania, the statute would not be applie. 29 Judge Ganey,
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, believed that it would be applied in those courts.30
In the earlier Pennsylvania case, Wagner v. Wagner,3 1 the di27. See comments in Taintor, What Law Governs the Ceremony, Incidents and
Status of Marriage, 19 B.U.L. REv. 358, 361-66 (1939).
28. 154 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
29. See Lembcke v. Lembcke, 181 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1950).
30. See In re MayalU's Naturalization, 154 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
31. 58 Mont. Co. L.R. 18 (C.P. 1941).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43 :889

vorce was decreed in New York, the parties "moved to Pennsylvania" and were married there. It cannot be said with certainty
whether the court considered their possible domicile in Pennsylvania, but it is clear that the opinion made nothing of it: the talk
was about exceptions to the common law rule that a marriage valid
where celebrated is valid everywhere. The most significant language was:
Since the public policies of the states of New York and Pennsylvania
are identical, full faith and credit should be given the positive statutes
and prohibitory decrees of such states. To recognize such a prohibited
marriage and give it legal effect would in a certain sense give countenance
entered into in defiance of a final decree of
by one decree to a marriage
82
the State of New York.
The trouble with this is two-fold. The policies of the two States
are not identical: New York forbids any remarriage of the libellee
for a time after a divorce for adultery; Pennsylvania, only remarriage to the paramour. Moreover, even if these parties had left
New York to marry intending to make that state the family domicile, their extrastate ceremony would have been wholly effective
to create a marriage under the law of New York: New York sees no
"defiance" of its decrees in such situations.
In the more recent Pennsylvania case, Kalmbacher v. Kalmbacher, 3 it is again not clear whether the parties, one of whom
had been divorced in New York, had acquired a domicile in Pennsylvania, but probably not. There was no finding that they had, but
there was a finding that they "resided" in New York at the time
of the divorce and another that the libellant who sought an annulment was not domiciled in the county in which the suit was
brought. The reasons are no more satisfactory than those in Wagner. The court quoted the language from Stull about wounding the
sensibilities of the innocent spouse, affronting the public decency,
and evasion of the law. 4 Obviously, there was no "evasion" of any
law. The innocent spouse was a New Yorker, a person whose sensibilities that statute does not thus protect. If there was no change of
domicile to Pennsylvania, no sense of public decency was thus protected by the state in which the parties would live. If there was such
a change there would have been, as I said above, little probability
that people in Pennsylvania would even know the case for the divorce.
3 disagreeing with the opinion in
In re Mayalrs Naturalization,
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 24. (Emphasis added.)
63 Pa. D. & C. 195 (C.P. 1945).
See quotation accompanying text at note 14 supra.
154 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1957).

MARRIAGE AFTER DIVORCE

897

Lembcke v. United States, 6 expressed "the firm conviction that...
a Pennsylvania court of statewide jurisdiction... would also disagree with that case." The court relied on Stull and on Schofield v.
Schofield (No. 1).37 The decision in Stull is not in point, nor is the
reasoning, as I have shown. Schofield is a queer case for the court to
rely on: it was there held that the extrastate marriage of first cousins
who intended to return promptly to their former Pennsylvania domicile was entirely effective.
In an early New York case, Stack v. Stack,38 it was held that the
Pennsylvania statute was not applicable to domiciliaries of another
state who married in Pennsylvania. The reason given was:
This provision forms a part of a statute which relates entirely to divorces
decreed by the courts of Pennsylvania in accordance with the laws of
that State. It affects only such persons as have been parties to divorce
proceedings in the tribunals of that State.... 9

Much the same reason was given in the recent case of Lemboke

v. Lembcke.40 This court knew of the position taken in the Pennsylvania case of KaImbacher and said that, if this were a diversity
case, it would have to follow the New York rule of Stack and In re
Palmer's Estate41 and hold the marriage valid. The court said, however: "For reasons already stated, we disagree with the construction which the KaImbacher case puts upon the statute and believe
that it would not be approved by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania." 42

Another, and a very cogent, reason was given by the court in In
re PalmersEstate. It said:
Apparently no court in Pennsylvania has had occasion to pass upon
this point That is only natural since the parties to such a marriage are
only in Pennsylvania long enough to be married, and leave immediately
to return to their domicile where the legal problems arise.... This fact

is significant not only as explaining the absence of decisions on the point
in Pennsylvania, but also because it emphasizes that a question of conflict
of laws is involved and that the domestic policy of the State of Pennsylvania is not an important factor....

As to persons domiciled in another state in which the parties will live
and which has no public policy against the marriage, Pennsylvania's ex36. 181 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1950). This opinion will be discussed infra.
37. 51 Pa. Super. 564 (1912).
38. 6 Dem. 280 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1887).
39. Id. at 284.
40. 181 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1950). Herein the Pennsylvania statute was spoken
of as a section of a "complete code for Pennsylvania divorces," which was enacted
as "An Act Concerning Divorces." Id. at 705.
41. 275 App. Div. 792, 80 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1949), affirming 192 Misc.
385, 79 N.Y.S.2d 405 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
42. 181 F.2d at 707.
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with the statute should not be
amination of the marriage in connection
43
in the light of its domestic policy.

It is probable that Louisiana will not apply her statute to mar-

riages of persons there, if they are not domiciled there. It was said
in Succession of Hernandez that "the place where marriage is con-

tracted is not so much that where the ceremony is performed as
that where the parties expect to live and settle....

That these statutes, indeed all statutes prohibiting certain types
of marriages, are not properly applicable if the only contact with
the state is that the ceremony is there performed is made clear by
understanding that "the laws concerning marriage are made up of
two parts: the substantive part, that regulating the status; and the
ceremonial part, that regulating the exchange of consents.
The only significant interest of the state where the ceremony
takes place is in the use of the forms prescribed by its laws. This
state is not touched by the existence of the status: the parties will
not live there; nor will their children, in whom there is a vital interest as future citizens, be its citizens. "And while the law of the
place where the ceremony is performed has an interest in the validity of the ceremony, it has none 'in the intrinsic validity of the
status, unless the status is to be enjoyed there.'46
CONCLUSION

These prohibitory statutes are properly applicable only where the
divorce is decreed in one of the three States and the libellee and
the paramour intend to make that State their family domicile, the
state in which they intend to live as man and wife. Only that state

has a significant interest in whether they are married or not.
43. 192 Misc. 385, 389-91, 79 N.Y.S.2d 404, 408-10 (Surr. Ct. 1948), afJ'd,
275 App. Div. 792, 90 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
44. 46 La. Ann. 962, 990, 15 So. 461, 469 (1894).
45. Taintor, supra note 27, at 361.
46. Sirois v. Sirois, 94 N.H. 215, 216, 50 A.2d 88 (1946), quoting Taintor,
supra note 27, at 368.

